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In this paper we set forth a new perspective from which to understand 
and measure the brokerage of asymmetric information that intermediaries 
usually carry out. Firstly, we deal with partitions of a given set so as to lay 
grounds to our line of research. Secondly, we argue that trade splits up 
imperfect information sets, over which traders try to negotiate and profit, 
but also hide their opportunistic behavior from their counterparts. Next, 
the brokerage of asymmetric information is framed so as to stress the fact 
that any exchange is dual, entailing not only bargaining property rights 
but also information value. Lastly, we bring to light the linkage between 
differential rates, residual information sets and trading environments, 
which seems to be a functional toolkit for assessing how much asymmetric 
information is brokered eventually. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Whenever any intermediary fulfills his professional tasks, he also carries out 
the role of a broker of asymmetric information2. To qualify this statement it 
seems helpful to proceed with a set of environments that brings to light 
how the intermediary performs his function. In other words, we will attempt 
to lay bare what could be named the geometric topology of information 
sets.      
 
The paper will go on developing the following topics: 
 
Sections 1 and 2 lay the groundwork, the former by establishing a general 
outcome that holds for partitions of a given set; the latter by introducing 
imperfect information sets and the dual nature of any trade. 
  
In section 3, it will be shown how trade between economic actors and 
intermediaries brings about a natural partition of their underlying 
information sets . It is for section 4 to set forth the framework where the 
brokerage of asymmetric information takes place. Last of all, section 5 
discusses trading environments with a focus on opportunistic behavior, by 
means of differential rates and residual information sets.  
 
This paper follows up a line of research started with a former work 
devoted to the transaction cost approach to financial assets, developed 
later with an extensive discussion about the brokerage of asymmetric 
information; and finally carried out by an inquiry about differential rates 
and residual information sets (namely, Apreda 2000 a, b; 2001; 2004).  
   
 
1. PARTITION OF A GIVEN SET 
 
As the idea of partition plays a key role in this chapter, it’s worth recalling 
its mathematical meaning. 
 
Definition 1  Set partition 
 
Given any non-empty set X, and a collection of subsets of X,  
 
F F   =  { A l l  Í Í  X :  l l  Î Î J,  J an index set } 
 
we say that F F is a partition of X (or that F F partitions X) if it holds that 
                                                 
2 An introduction to this issue, and the place where we coined the expression “the 
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a) X  =  È È A l l , 
 
b) A l l Ç Ç A m m  ¹ ¹  Æ Æ  ,  for every pair  l l, m m  of different elements in the 
index set3. 
 
Before moving on to what is the main concern of this paper, the 
brokerage of information sets, we need to bring into play the following 
lemmas, of which we are going to produce their proofs.     
 
Lemma 1 Given two non empty sets A and B, their union can be 
partitioned in the following way: 
 
A È È B  =  ( A Ç Ç Bc )  È È  ( Ac Ç Ç B ) È È  ( A Ç Ç B ) 
 
Proof: firstly, we have to prove the double inclusion; secondly, that the 
right side in the equation above really partitions the left side.  
 
Let start supposing that x Î A È È B, then it must belong to A or to B. If it is 
not the case that x Î A Ç Ç B, it follows that either it belongs to A without 
belonging to B, or the other way round. That is to say, x Î ( A Ç Ç Bc )  or x Î ( 
Ac Ç Ç B ). Hence, this shows that the set on the left side is included in the set 
on the right side of the equation. 
 
Now, let us assume that  
 
x Î ( A Ç Ç Bc )  È È  ( Ac Ç Ç B ) È È  ( A Ç Ç B ) 
 
then it must belong to one of these sets. Without loss of generality, if it 
were the case that  x Î ( A Ç Ç Bc ), then x belongs to A without belonging 
to B, so in the end we have that   x Î A È È B, and the same procedure 
holds in the other two cases. In conclusion it is true that    
 
( A Ç Ç Bc )  È È  ( Ac Ç Ç B ) È È  ( A Ç Ç B )  Í Í  A È È B 
 
and the equality of both sets it comes after.  
 
To prove that we have partitioned the union of both sets, the only thing it 
remains to bring to light is that the three subsets on the right side are 
disjoint, that is, they do not share not even a single element. But this 
comes from their definition, since the two first sets have each of them 
                                                 
3  The index set can be finite or non-finite. In the remaining of this book our focus will be 
on finite structures of sets, however.  Universidad del Cema                       Working Paper number 288, March 2005                   Dr.  Rodolfo Apreda  
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points that belong only to one of them at a turn, while the third have point 
that only belong to both sets. < END > 
 
It is worth remarking here that the conclusion of the lemma 
 
A È È B  =  ( A Ç Ç Bc )  È È  ( Ac Ç Ç B ) È È  ( A Ç Ç B ) 
 
can be rewritten in a more operational fashion that will come in handy 
whenever we handle an arbitrary collection of sets. 
 
 
A 1 È È A 2  =  È È { ( A 1k(1) Ç Ç A 2k(2) ) } 
 
such that  
 
k(1), k(2)Î { 1, –1 } and the case k(1) = k(2) = –1 is forbidden  
 
 
When the exponent of a set is 1, it means we work with the set itself; when 
it marked by  –1, it means its complement4.  
 
Plain as it is, the former lemma allows us to give a general statement that it 
will follow from complete induction.   
 
Lemma 2 Given a finite family of non empty sets 
 
{ A1 , A2 , A3 ,  ………  ,  AN } 
 
their union can be partitioned in the following way: 
 
È È 1  £ £  j £ £ N A j   =  È È { ( A 1 k(1) Ç Ç A 2 k(2) Ç Ç A 3 k(3)  Ç Ç ……..  Ç Ç A N  k(N)) } 
 
such that k(1), k(2), k(3), ….. , k(N) Î { 1, -1 }  
 
and the case k(1) = k(2) = k(3) = …..  =  k(N)  = -1 is forbidden  
 
Proof: the inductive foundation is provided by lemma 1. So the statement 
is true when n = 2. 
 
Let us assume that the statement is true when n = p, and let us see if it 
follows that is also true for n = p + 1. We start with the left side of the target 
statement.   
                                                 
4 So, A1 reads as A1 1, while A2 c reads as A2 – 1 .  Universidad del Cema                       Working Paper number 288, March 2005                   Dr.  Rodolfo Apreda  
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(1) 
È È 1 £ £ j £ £ p+ 1 A j   =   [  È È 1 £ £ j £ £ p A j   ]  È È A p + 1 
 
Now, we can see that the expression between square brackets in (1) fulfills 
the inductive statement. Hence, 
(2) 
[  È È 1 £ £ j £ £ p   A j   ]  È È A p + 1 =   
 
=  È È { ( A 1 k(1) Ç Ç A 2 k(2) Ç Ç A 3 k(3)  Ç Ç ……..  Ç Ç A p k(p)) } È È A p + 1 
 
We can regard the big set on the left side of (2) as consisting of the union 
of two distinctive sets: 
 
A   =   È È 1 £ £ j £ £ p   A j    
 
B  =  A p + 1 
 
Therefore, by using Lemma 1 we are able to write: 
 
A È È B  =  ( A Ç Ç Bc )  È È  ( Ac Ç Ç B ) È È  ( A Ç Ç B ) 
 
but this amounts to, namely,  
 
a) 
( A Ç Ç Bc )  = ( È È 1 £ £ j £ £ p   A j )  Ç Ç A p + 1 c 
b) 
( Ac Ç Ç B )  =  ( È È 1 £ £ j £ £ p   A j )c  Ç Ç A p + 1  
c) 
( A Ç Ç B )   =  ( È È 1 £ £ j £ £ p   A j )  Ç Ç A p + 1  
 
We take advantage of (2) and plug the result in the three relationships just 
to reach the following outcomes: 
 
a’) 
( A Ç Ç Bc )  = 
  
=  (È È { ( A 1 k(1) Ç Ç A 2 k(2) Ç Ç A 3 k(3)  Ç Ç ……..  Ç Ç A p k(p)) })  Ç Ç A p + 1 c 
 
and by the distributive property,  
(3) 
( A Ç Ç Bc )  =  
 
=  È È {  ( A 1 k(1) Ç Ç A 2 k(2) Ç Ç A 3 k(3)  Ç Ç ……..  Ç Ç A p k(p)   Ç Ç A p + 1 c ) } 
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b’) 
( Ac Ç Ç B )  = 
  
=  ( È È 1 £ £ j £ £ p   A j )c  Ç Ç A p + 1  
 
and profiting from one of the well-known De Morgan’s generalized 
properties of complementation, it holds that5 
(4) 
( Ac Ç Ç B )  =  
 
=   A 1c  Ç Ç A 2c  Ç Ç A 3c  Ç Ç ……..   Ç Ç A pc   Ç Ç A p + 1 
c’) 
( A Ç Ç B )   =   
 
=   (È È { ( A 1 k(1) Ç Ç A 2 k(2) Ç Ç A 3 k(3)  Ç Ç ……..   Ç Ç A p k(p)) })  Ç Ç A p + 1  
 
this is easier, since we can straightforwardly apply the distributive property 
that leads to 
(5) 
( A Ç Ç B )   =   
=   È È { ( A 1 k(1) Ç Ç A 2 k(2) Ç Ç A 3 k(3)  Ç Ç ……..   Ç Ç A p k(p) Ç Ç A p + 1 )  } 
 
It is time to come back to (1) profiting from (3), (4), (5). 
 
È È 1  £ £  j £ £ p + 1 A j   =   
 
È È { ( A 1 k(1) Ç Ç A 2 k(2) Ç Ç A 3 k(3)  Ç Ç ……..   Ç Ç A p + 1  k(p + 1)) } 
 
Applying the principle of complete induction, the statement is true for any 
value of n.  < END >  
 
 
2.  INFORMATION SETS 
 
Either by trading straight with another party, or by means of a third agent 
who acts on his behalf as an intermediary, any economic actor6 makes 
up his mind on the basis of available information. Such information can 
stem from his own stock or, still further, from the one supplied by his 
                                                 
5 A harder way would be to develop the right side of (2) with the complement, as the 
reader can verify when N = 2, getting the same outcome in the end. 
6 It goes without saying that “economic actor”(or agent) stands for both individuals and 
organizations. Universidad del Cema                       Working Paper number 288, March 2005                   Dr.  Rodolfo Apreda  
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counterpart or intermediary. In this context, trading refers to a wide range 
of distinctive events or processes which involve buying or selling, 
intermediating, contracting, keeping long or short future positions in the 
commodities, financial or labor markets. Narrowing down the examples to 
the subject of this paper, namely the financial markets, trading commit 
economic agents to manifold choices: from buying or selling financial 
assets to lending or borrowing in the credit market; from merging two 
companies to signing a partnership contract in a venture capital concern; 
from enacting a plain vanilla swap to the underwriting of an Initial Public 
Offer for either equity or debt. It seems sensible, therefore, to make 
precise what is meant by information sets. 
 
Definition 2  Information Sets 
 
By the Information Set of certain economic actor “ e “ at date “ t “ is 
meant all the available information he gets access up to that date.  
 
We denote such a set as  
W W( t ; e ) 
 
and the fact that past information up to that date is also stored in the 
current information set can be translated by the nesting condition: 
 
W W( t – j  ; e )    Í Í    W W( t ; e )    ;      j : 1, 2, 3, ...... 
 
Therefore, decision-making turns out to be contingent upon information 
sets. Although this is the customary format of what we understand as an 
information set, some qualifications should be borne in mind for the sake 
not only of semantics but rigor, as well. 
 
a) We said that the agent stores only attainable information to him. This 
means he reaches his decision, in most cases, with only a fraction of 
the whole information to which he could get access.   
   
b) Although information sets can be regarded as plausible databanks for 
any agent, they also convey the idea of toolkits for decision-making. In 
fact, they include mathematical models and heuristic procedures, 
points of view and beliefs, market trends, biases, error analysis and 
learning processes. Also past experiences, technological resources, 
and professional qualifications, just to give some particular examples of 
such pervasive notion.  
 
c) A problem arises from this customary format and it hinges upon its 
vagueness. For the agent to reach his decisions, the information set Universidad del Cema                       Working Paper number 288, March 2005                   Dr.  Rodolfo Apreda  
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should be freed from any content that has nothing to do with her 
purposes. This could prove an uneasy task to accomplish, but for an 
intermediary dealing with Treasury Bonds it doesn’t seem sensible to 
keep in his information set an unrelated passion for gardening or 
painting; even less his own home affairs linked with neither his 
investments nor his trading behavior7. Even worse, we could not draw a 
distinction between useful information and garbage8.  
 
d) It is usually assumed that information sets fulfill a nesting property: prior 
information sets are contained in the current one. In other words: past 
information is not lost. W W(t ; k) includes, for instance, the information set 
that existed two periods before, W W(t-2 ; k). It goes without saying that 
most of the old information sets might have been as incomplete as the 
current one, mastering the economic actor only a fraction of the 
available information at each date. 
 
Turning now to the most representative actors who trade upon their 
underlying information sets, we have to bear in mind that in most 
commodities exchanges and capital markets since the XIX century9 at 






and the intermediary.  
 
Most of the time, counterparts agree to bind themselves to commitments 
which can be as simple as an implicit contract (for instance, any 
consumer shopping for groceries), or an explicit and complex one like the 
one binding a corporation with its newly appointed Chief Executive 
Officer10. 
 
                                                 
7 More background in Apreda ( 2001) 
8 By all means, it is bounded rationality that lies at the root of this constraint. 
9 Capital markets, at least with their nowadays features, were already established by 
1850, in spite of wide gaps with our current information technology, financial engineering 
and regulatory frameworks. However, they are much older institutions and Meier Kohn 
(1999) gives a surprising account of capital markets prior to 1600.  
10 An appointment of this sort may uncover a complex spadework, starting with a 
professional search process with screening and tight competition, being followed by a 
detailed and costly contract design, ending with the engineering of compensation 
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Therefore, as we approach real world transactions, either transient or 
permanent ones, information sets not only store the records about the 
things to be traded, but also how trade is to be performed, inclusive of the 
agents’ needs and those expectations closely connected with the whole 
process.      
 
Although it is usually said that in a frictionless market any agent gets 
access to all available information, such a statement seems misplaced. In 
fact, transaction costs, (even taxes), credit risk, bankruptcy chances, 
agency problems and information asymmetries are utterly ruled out. Even 
worse, such an ideal world does not take intermediaries into account. In 
fact, neoclassical analysis kept the whole issue of information sets as a 
given notion in the dark, oblivious of any costly and non-shared 
information11. 
 
However, in real markets a lot of relevant information lies outside this ideal 

























Picture 1 : The Perfect and the Maximal Information Sets 
 
 
                                                 
11 The first two chapters of our latest book “Capital Markets, Portfolio Management and 
Corporate Governance” may be useful to the interested reader (Apreda, 2005a).  
 
W W(t ; maximal)     
 
 all likely information at the reach of any economic  
agent;  market frictions and noises also included 
 
W W(t ; k ; perfect) 
 
it stems from perfect information sets´ 
assumptions,  albeit  a lot of accessible 
information remains outside this set 
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The universal set, as mathematical Set Theory requires12, would be  
 
W W(t ; maximal) 
 
that reads “the maximal set of information available to all economic 
agents, at date t”. It certainly includes the ideal perfect information set, 
beyond which we can find for instance transaction costs, taxes, market 
microstructure issues, and private information that might be held back 
because of opportunistic behavior. It contains all information available to 
all economic agents, either useful or useless.  
 
2.1 IMPERFECT INFORMATION SETS 
 
Whereas we would be the last to deny the importance of the perfect 
market paradigm as a theoretical benchmark, when we come down to 
single and observable markets, however, imperfect information and 
inefficient markets are not only the rule but also a fact of life13.  
 
Indeed, the economic agent k gets access to an information set which is 
rather a subset of the maximal information set at date t (see picture 2),  
 
W W(t ; perfect)    Í Í    W W(t ; k ; imperfect)    Í Í    W W(t ; maximal) 
 
Not to be surprised, the perfect set is the minimal one, contained in any 
imperfect set, because it is available to any economic agent free of 
charge (costlessly and immediately). 
  
As from now and for ease of notation, any imperfect information set will 
be denoted 
W W(t ; k ) 
 
whenever this will be clear from the context. Otherwise, we will resort to 
add qualifications by means of vectorial notation, as when we wrote 
above  W W(t ; k ; imperfect). 
                                                 
12 In a mathematical setting, this would usually be denoted by U or X (the universal set), 
which comes as the precondition upon which all other sets are well-defined.  
13 If markets were efficient in Fama’s sense, information sets would be identical for all 
economic agents. In this case, prices could convey all available information instantly 
and costlessly (Fama, 1970, 1990), to the extent of making intermediaries redundant. But 
this is not granted in the real world and, therefore, inefficient markets have become a 
worthy field of study (Shleifer, 2000). By contrasting an ideal economy where there is 
perfect information with another one endowed with imperfect information only, 
Goldman and Sosin (1979) established a simple and interesting measure of market 
inefficiency.  
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Picture 2 : Imperfect Information Sets and improvements 
 
 
W W(t ; maximal) 
all likely information at the reach of any economic agent 
 
W W(t ; k ; imperfect with improvements) 
 
The economic actor seeks and pays for additional information, in order to 




W W(t ; k ; imperfect ) 
 
This is the real world information set available to economic 
actor k, as long as he is his own provider, without paying for 
additional information. 
 
   
  W W(t ; perfect ) 
 
We can visualize the perfect information set as 
included in W(t; k; imperfect), because all economic 
actors, if living in such implausible world, would 
share it at no cost and without delay.  
This restricted source of information can be proxied 
by the public information set or the common 
knowledge set. 
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Imperfect information sets exhibit some remarkable properties: 
 
(a) Different agents have different information sets. 
 
(b) W W(t ; perfect) is the common ground knowledge they would attain 
in the realm of a frictionless world with perfect markets and 
symmetric information. 
  
(c) Each agent can shape up his own information set by adding better 
or new information at the moment t. A foremost source of 
information comes out of market regulations on disclosure of 
information. Besides, there has grown an information industry in 
financial markets, trading on data assembly and securities analysis, 
fostered by the financial press, government agencies, business 
schools, executives training programs, academic or institutional 
research centers.  
 
For instance, by buying such information from an expert or 
intermediary, the agent k could enhance her efficiency at 
valuation and forecasting. But this is contingent upon the agent’s 
willingness to budget for new and better information, or to preclude 
her from doing it. 
 
(d) Any time the information set is improved, the new one not only 
contains the older, but it is also contained in the limit set. That is to 
say: 
 
W W(t; k; imperfect)   Í Í   W W(t; k; imperfect with improvements)  Í Í  
 
Í Í   W W( t; maximal ) 
 
(e) The imperfect information set features the property of conditional 
accountability: the agent could give account of its contents, 
although he may be willing to disclose most of them hardly ever. 
  
(f) Changes in information definitely trigger off arbitrage opportunities 
and market adjustments. 
 
Hence, improvements in the agent´s information at moment t could come 
from the outside, mainly by acquisition of private or professional 
information at his own cost, although sometimes he may pursue this 
process by taking advantage of inside information supplied by a third 
party at the risk of flouting the rules, or even breaking the law.  
 Universidad del Cema                       Working Paper number 288, March 2005                   Dr.  Rodolfo Apreda  
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Markets that run at variance with the assumptions of the standard 
paradigm are labeled IMPERFECT MARKETS14. 
  
If we wondered what is really at stake when trading or brokering, then we 
should stress the duality of this process15. 
 
Definition 3  The Duality of any Trade 
 
Whenever two parties carry out any trade and bring it to completion, two 
processes are at play simultaneously: 
 
a) there is a swap of property rights; 
 




3. HOW TRADE SPLITS UP INFORMATION SETS 
 
If we take a look at picture 3, we see the three information sets partitioned 
on their own. For instance, W W(t ; k) can be explained by four components: 
 
W W( t ; k )   =   [ W W(t;k)  Ç Ç  W WC(t;s) Ç Ç  W WC(t;I) ]  È È  [ W W(t;k)  Ç Ç  W W(t;s) Ç Ç  W WC(t;I)  ]  È È 
 
È È [ W W(t;k)  Ç Ç  W WC(t;s) Ç Ç  W W(t;I) ] È È [ W W(t;k)  Ç Ç  W W(t;s) Ç Ç  W W(t;I) ] 
 
On the other hand, the union of the three main information sets gives rise 
to seven mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets. We had laid down the 
foundations of this statement by means of lemmas 1 and 2, in section 1.  
       
Hence, the economic actors k and s trade with the intermediary i, and 
asymmetric information pervades their relationships to the extent of 
bringing about a full partition of their information sets. We are going to set 
up mutually exclusive environments, in order to describe this partition16. 
                                                 
14 It is because of imperfect information, division of labor and specialization that these 
markets call for intermediaries and institutional environments (Spulber, 1999).  
15 This could hold in explicit or implicit way. What agent X sells is not only a good (either 
merchandise, service, or a financial) but, in the first place, underlying property rights 
attached to the good and, in the second place, the extent to which information 
pertaining the good or the actual transaction is actually exchanged, hidden, even 
misrepresented.  
16 This method provides what it could be denoted the geometric topology of information 
sets.    
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Picture 3 :  Partitioning information sets: dealers as brokers of asymmetric Information 
 
Environment 1  
Pooling Information Sets 
 
When agents k and s trade with the dealer, both of them may wish to buy 
(or sell) him a financial asset. Perhaps they are willing to take different 









 W W(t;k)  Ç Ç  W WC(t;s) Ç Ç  W WC(t;I)         
                                                                 
W W(t;s)                                                                                                                                                       
                   2                                                          
     5 
W W(t;k) Ç Ç W W(t;s) Ç Ç W WC(t;I) 
                                                             
                                    W WC(t;k)  Ç Ç W W(t;s) Ç Ç W WC(t;I) 
 
                      3 
 1 
 W W(t;k)  Ç Ç  W WC(t;s) Ç Ç  W W(t;I) 




       4 
        




    W WC(t;k)  Ç Ç  W WC(t;s) Ç Ç  W W(t;I) 
                                                                          W W(t;I) 
7 
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Anyway, for the trade to be effective, all participants carry on their 
purposes starting from the common ground information set that it will be 
named subset 1 and defined by     
 
W W( t ; k )  Ç Ç  W W( t ; s )  Ç Ç  W W( t ; i ) 
 
By the same token, when a single economic actor k trades with an 
intermediary both pool their information sets, to the extent of sharing 
information so as to round off the exchange. That is to say:  
 
W W( t ; k )   Ç Ç   W W( t ; I ) 
 
which is the outcome of adding sets 3 and 1. 
 
From picture 3, we can get a grasp that pooling doesn’t mean losing all 
the private information endowment each economic actor is entitled to. 
 
Environment 2   
Private knowledge on the side of both agents 
 
Next, let us now suppose that both agents share some sort of information 
not easily accessible to the intermediary. This could be the case when 
investors are conversant about restrictions to their portfolios set up by 
regulators, or profit from inside information (perhaps they have knowledge 
of an impending change in the company whose securities they are 
interested in).   
 
Another example can be drawn from two traders who believe they have 
a compelling rationale to buy or sell certain financial asset, disregarding 
fundamental values17. Furthermore, let imagine that both traders (perhaps 
chartists) are willing to overcome the dealer and bring him into a loss. 
 
Where is such information to be located? It is embedded in subset 2: 
 
W W( t ; k )   Ç Ç  W W ( t ; s )  Ç Ç  W W C ( t ; i ) 
 
More precisely, we should write 
 
W W( t ; k )   Ç Ç  W W ( t ; s )  Ç Ç  W W C ( t ; i )   =   
 
                                                 
17 In some current models, they would be labeled non-informed traders, which is rather a 
misleading expression. Both are informed actually, although their knowledge is at 
variance with the information claimed by those that reach their decision-making on the 
grounds of fundamental values.  Universidad del Cema                       Working Paper number 288, March 2005                   Dr.  Rodolfo Apreda  
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=  { x Î Î W W( t ; maximal ):   x Î Î W W( t ; s ) and x Î Î W W( t ; k )  and  x Ï Ï W W( t ; i ) } 
 
Environment 3 
Private knowledge on the side of the dealer  
 
By the same token, let us rephrase the former environment so as to make 
the dealer the owner of some private information that allows him to 
overwhelm those economic agents that come to him asking to sell 
securities because of liquidity or portfolio rebalancing targets. Being 
knowledgeable, the dealer will be able to buy assets paying less than 
otherwise (that is to say, sellers would perform like liquidity-traders, as they 
are referred in some current models). The distinctive information subset 7 
that grants the dealer with such an advantage is defined as  
 
W WC ( t ; k )  Ç Ç  W WC ( t ; s )  Ç Ç  W W( t ; i ) 
Environment 4 
Exclusive private information  
 
This is the usual environment where the most customary adverse selection 
problems arise. Let us assume that  
 
W W ( t ; k ) 
 
is the information set of a corporation which moves towards a public  
offering in the capital market  for either a forthcoming bond or stock of 
their own. A plausible dealer could be an investment bank,  
 
W W ( t ; i ) 
while  
 
W W ( t ; s ) 
 
stands for any broker acting on behalf of its customers and ready to place 
their purchasing orders. For the company, opportunistic behavior is 
fostered by subset 6: 
  
W W( t ; k )   Ç Ç  W WC ( t ; s )  Ç Ç  W WC ( t ; i ) 
 
The broker conveys private information and financial secrecy when 
dealing on his customers’ account, hence resorting to information subset 
5: 
 
W WC ( t ; k )  Ç Ç  W W( t ; s )  Ç Ç W WC ( t ; i ) 
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In actual practice, perhaps the broker is submitting significant buying 
orders from institutional investors, or he is covering up a transaction in the 
market for corporate control. 
 
Therefore, any information set holds a subset that is privy to each actor. 
That is to say, agent k hoards some information that he keeps under 
wraps, and the same holds true for agent s. It goes without saying that the 
intermediary also profits from his private knowledge, as we saw in 
environment 3 that led to subset 7. 
 
At this juncture, we must be aware that two opposing and driving actors 
are at play: informed and uninformed agents. Informed agents may have 
better information than the intermediaries about the value of the asset. 
For instance, they may know the asset is undervalued at the ask price, or 
overvalued at the bid price. As they go on trading, it is the intermediary 
who makes a loss. On the other hand, uninformed agents trade for 
liquidity. It is within such dynamic contest that intermediaries manage their 
bid-ask spread so as to balance the losses from trading with informed 
investors by means of profits made with uninformed investors.  
 
Another development, on the side of speculators, is worthy of being 
noticed. Speculators can distort prices by introducing “misinformation” 
into a market. By so acting, speculators behave not as more rational 
traders do; it is said that they behave irrationally18. Hence, they buy or sell 
securities without taking into account midstream information. They 
become “noise traders”, mistakenly following irrational information as it 
was fundamental or rational information. They hardly meet the passive 
investment strategies that the Efficient Markets Model would forecast for 
traders with poor or none information. 
  
But if “irrational traders” become a greater crowd, they may overwhelm 
rational traders and bring about price distortions. They can be 
misinformed but not stupid at coping with transaction prices or price 
changes. What is at stake here is nothing less than the grabbing of 
informational rents and the arbitrage against information sets.  
 
                                                 
18 “Rational and irrational traders” seems a misleading phrase, to say the least. Both 
agents are rational most of the time (we dare say they are extremely rational). But they 
do not follow the same type of rationality. One keeps himself within the common 
knowledge set, whereas the other contests this information set, even by resorting to a 
paradoxical logic.     Universidad del Cema                       Working Paper number 288, March 2005                   Dr.  Rodolfo Apreda  
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Environment 5           
An agent shares information with the intermediary but not with the other 
agent 
 
This environment comes to be the customary concern, as far as bilateral 
negotiations are at stake. The dealer can improve his relationship with 
agent k because both of them may share information not accessible to 
agent s by means of  
 
W W( t ; k )   Ç Ç  W WC ( t ; s )  Ç Ç  W W( t ; i ) 
 
which leads to subset 3 that could be seen as information production on 
behalf of agent k, and it comes at a cost for him. The dealer can claim 
this service through a higher fee than the one he would charge otherwise, 
by only using the common knowledge set. 
 
By the same token, the dealer can improve his relationship with agent s 
because both of them may share information not easily accessible for 
agent k, as depicted in subset 4:  
 
W WC ( t ; k )  Ç Ç  W W( t ; s )  Ç Ç  W W( t ; i ) 
 
 
4. FRAMING THE BROKERAGE OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
 
For the time being, let us assume that the information set claimed by a 
decision-maker k at date t 
W W( t ; k ) 
 
allows him to handle a rate of return linked to a distinctive economic 
variable19 
 
that comes defined along the investment horizon H = [ t ; T ], contingent 
upon the stated information set. If we knew that we can assess another 
information set  W W 1 ( t ; k ) such that it holds 
 
W W 1 ( t ; k )   Í Í   W W( t ; k ) 
 
which explains reasonably well the value of a rate of return 
                                                 
19 In the case of a financial asset, the variable is price (or some proxy of it); therefore we 
mean here the rate of return of that financial asset. But there are other natural examples, 
as in the foreign exchange market when dealing with the appreciation or depreciation 
of the foreign currency against the domestic one. Also we could point to the rate that 
measures the change undergone by certain index.  Universidad del Cema                       Working Paper number 288, March 2005                   Dr.  Rodolfo Apreda  
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r 1 ( t, T, W W 1 ( t ; k ) ) 
 
then we could attempt to measure how much of the starting rate remains 
unexplained by this new one. This is the logic behind the complementary 
notions of differential rate of return and residual information set. We are 
going to provide a simplified definition of both concepts, good enough 
for the purposes of this paper. But the reader should keep in mind that 
when we try to deal with more than two differential rates and residual 
information sets, the mathematics of the subject become more intricate 
and we have to deal with algebras of sets, a complete development of 
which we have provided elsewhere (Apreda, 2000a, 2004).  
 
Definition 4  Differential Rates and Residual Information Sets 
 
The rate of return g( . ) that solves the following equation 
 
[ 1  +  r( t, T, W W( t ; k ) ) ]  =   
 
=  [ 1  + g( t, T,  W W R ( t ; k ) ) ] . [ 1 +  r 1 ( t, T, W W 1 ( t ; k ) ) ] 
 
is called the differential rate of r( . ) given r 1 ( . ) , whereas the underlying 
information set for this rate 
 
W W R ( t ; k ) 
 gets the label of residual. 
 
At this juncture, let us assume that agent k is a seller of security ABC, for 
example, and agent s is a prospective buyer of it. A dealer could handle 
the transaction outright as a round-off exchange. If there were not an 
agent s available at the moment, it would be for the dealer to provide 
liquidity to agent k, buying the security and holding it in stock. This is a 
usual way of trading, rather mechanical.  
 
But let us regard a more complex setting, as when big blocks of bonds or 
shares are at stake, also when new private or public placements are the 
concern of an agent k, and let us assume that agent s is a portfolio 
arbitrageur. In this case, instead of designing a spread on the grounds of 
a common knowledge set 
 
W W( t ; common knowledge )  =  W W( t ; k )  Ç Ç  W W( t ; s )  Ç Ç  W W( t ; i ) 
 
that stems from the following relationship  
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P[asked, W W( t ; common knowledge )]  = 
 
=  P[bid, W W( t ; common knowledge )]  . [ 1 + spread(common knowledge ) ] 
 
the dealer engineers a truly distinctive information structure because he 
knows that both economic actors would be taking advantage not only of 
the common knowledge subset, but also of their more hidden information 
subsets: 
 
Agent k:  
 
[  W W( t ; k )   Ç Ç  W WC ( t ; s )  Ç Ç  W WC ( t ; i )  ]   È È   [  W W( t ; k )  Ç Ç  W W( t ; s )  Ç Ç  W W( t ; i )  ] 
 
Agent s:  
 
[  W WC ( t ; k )  Ç Ç  W W( t ; s )  Ç Ç W WC ( t ; I )  ]   È È   [  W W( t ; k )  Ç Ç  W W( t ; s )  Ç Ç  W W( t ; i )  ] 
 
so the actual spread the dealer is going to set up will be grounded on his 
own enhanced information structure, so as to hedge his informational risk: 
 




W W( t ; private knowledge ; i )    =   [ W W(t ; k)  Ç Ç W WC (t ; s)  Ç Ç W W (t ; i) ]  È È 
 
È È   [ W W(t ; k)C Ç Ç W W(t ; s)C Ç Ç W W(t ; i) ]   È È   [ W WC (t ; k) Ç Ç W W(t ; s) Ç Ç W W (t ; i) ] 
 
that means that agent k may accept a bid price less than the bid price 
assessed with only the common knowledge set. On the other hand, agent 
s will accept an ask price higher than the ask price that would have 
obtained through the common knowledge set. Therefore, the final spread 
is wider than otherwise, because it has impounded a differential rate of 
return the dealer charges because of his brokerage of asymmetric 
information. Mathematically, this runs as follows: 
 
Lemma 3 The final spread the dealer charges on the grounds of the 
common knowledge and his private information can be 
broken down by means of the following relationship 
 
[ 1  +  spread  ]   =   [1 + spread (t ; bid) ] . 
 
. [1 + spread (t ; asked) ] . [1 + spread(common knowledge ) ] 
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Proof: 
 
The dealer charges an implicit spread to both legs of the transaction: 
 
c) additional spread on the buying side 
 
P[bid, W W( t ; common knowledge )]   = 
 
=  P[bid, W W( t ; private knowledge ; I )] . [ 1  +  spread (t ; bid) ] 
 
d) additional spread on the selling side 
 
(6) 
P[asked, W W( t ; private knowledge ; i )]   = 
 
=  P[asked, W W( t ; common knowledge)] . [ 1  +  spread (t ; asked) ] 
 
Now, recalling that with only the common knowledge set the spread 
comes out of  
(7) 
P[asked, W W( t ; common knowledge )]  = 
 
=  P[bid, W W( t ; common knowledge )]  . [ 1 + spread( common knowledge ) ] 
 
if we multiply both sides of (7) by 
 
[ 1  +  spread (t ; asked) ]  
it holds that  
 
P[asked, W W( t ; common knowledge)] . [ 1  +  spread (t ; asked) ]   = 
 
=   P[bid, W W( t ; common knowledge)] . [ 1  +  spread (t ; asked) ] .  
 
. [ 1  +  spread (t ; common knowledge) ]  
 
and by using (6) and (7) we get 
 
P[asked, W W( t ; private knowledge ; i)]   = 
 
=  P[bid, W W( t ; private knowledge ; i)] . [ 1  +  spread (t ; bid) ] .  
 
. [ 1  +  spread (t ; asked) ] . [ 1 + spread(common knowledge) ] 
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Now we can work out the final spread the dealer charges from using both 
the common knowledge subset and the private one.  
 
[ 1  +  spread  ]   =   [1 + spread (t ; bid) ] . 
 
. [1 + spread (t ; asked) ] . [1 + spread(common knowledge ) ]  < END > 
 
 
5. TRADING ENVIRONMENTS UNDER OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR 
 
In this section, we are going to approach our subject from another 
viewpoint. Instead of stressing asymmetric information, we will focus on 
opportunistic behavior. In fact, it performs as a complementary line of 
analysis, since asymmetric information does not necessarily imply 
opportunistic behavior, albeit the latter almost always matches up the 
former. 
  
Let us assume two traders, S and B, the former wanting to sell asset A, the 
latter wanting to buy it. The information sets available at date t are the 
following: 
 
W W S    =  W W  (common knowledge)  È È W WS  (private, technical)  È È 
 
È È W WS  (private, opportunistic) 
 
W W B   =  W W  (common knowledge)  È È W WB (private, technical)  È È  
 
È È W WB  (private, opportunistic) 
 
For ease of notation, we are going to rewrite these sets as: 
 
W W S    =  W W  (c k)  È È W WS  (p, tech)  È È W WS  (p, opp) 
 
W W B   =  W W  (c k)  È È W WB (p, tech)  È È W WB  (p, opp) 
 
There are some environments that come in handy at this stage to illustrate 
how residual information sets are naturally involved with the brokerage of 
asymmetric information.    
 
Environment 1 
Seller and buyer agree on the underlying value and close the deal in 
what we can term a fair exchange.  
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In the language of portfolio managers, for that asset would not be 
arbitrage opportunities from which to reap any extraordinary rent. In this 
case, both traders reach to almost the same expected return for the 
asset: 
1  +  E[ r(A; W W S ) ]   =   1  +  E[ r(A; W W B ) ] 
 
and the analysis for each side of the exchange would show that the 
common knowledge set was the main one in nurturing that return 
assessment. In other words, 
 
W W S    =   W W  (c k)   =   W W B    
 
This would be the outcome in a very competitive market, fully arbitraged, 
close to the paradigm of efficient markets in Fama’s sense (bear in mind, 
however, that nothing grants that this setting might be suitable for other 
assets traded in the market at that moment).  
 
Environment 2 
The seller fixes a price that is higher than the fundamental value. The 
buyer, however, signs out the deal in spite of the overvaluation.  
 
This is a situation for which there are manifold explanations: for instance, 
the superior technical knowledge on the side of the seller or the relative 
ignorance of the buyer. It is also typical of the smart-money trader against 
a noise trader, both of them with conflicting assessments of the asset 
returns. Finally, the seller may misrepresent the features of the trade with 
guile, by taking advantage of superior information and opportunistic 
behavior. Let us discuss two clear-cut examples. 
 
· Scenario 1:  There is no opportunistic behavior. 
 
The relevant information set for the seller, seems to be  
 
W W S    =  W W  (c k)  È È W WS  (p, tech)   
 
and the final assessment is conveyed by differential rates and residual 
information sets this way: 
(8) 
1  +  E[ r(A; W W S ) ]   =   
 
=   < 1  +  E[ r(A; W W  (c k)  ) ] >  .  < 1  +  E[ r(A; W WS  (p, tech)  ) ] > 
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In this setting, the buyer is a price-taker. And the only residual information 
set that comes in handy for him is the common knowledge one from 
which his own assessment leads to 
 
1  +  E[ r(A; W W B ) ]   =  < 1  +  E[ r(A; W W  (c k)  ) ] > 
 
As they go on with the deal, the seller is charging the buyer with a higher 
price than the one the buyer would have wished to meet20. Hence, the 
buyer’s expected return is lessened to the extent of the seller’s mark -up 
who proceeds to grab an arbitrage profit over his own assessment of the 
expected return of the asset. The differential rate that measures up this 
grabbing will be denoted by g(S). 
(9) 
1  +  E[ r(A; W W S ) ]   =   < 1  +  E[ r(A; W W B ) ] >  .  < 1  +  g( S )  >  
 
What this relationship reports is that the seller seizes upon the underlying 
price from a fair valuation model gross of transaction costs, and also 
benefits from an arbitrage gap that gives account of his superior 
information and power at setting up the final price. That is to say, his 
actual return comes out of 
 
1 +  E[ r(A; W W S ) ] 
  
whereas the consequence for the buyer is to pay more, but only profit 
from  
< 1  +  E[ r(A; W W B ) ] > 
 
If we now look at  (8) and (9), it doesn’t come as a surprise that  
 
< 1  +  g( S )  >  =   < 1  +  E[ r(A; W WS  (p, tech)  ) ] > 
  
Last of all, and taking a step further in the argument, we could assume 
that when B and S worked out the “break-even” expected return 
provided by the common knowledge set, what they actually intended to 
do was to blend a forecast from valuation models with a transaction costs 
rate. Let us delve into this process with greater detail.   
 
Firstly, by means of a valuation model they should have arrived to   
                                                 
20 The buyer pays more because he agrees about the fair return provided by  
 
E[ r(A; W W  (c k)  ) ] 
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  < 1  +  E[ r(A; W W  (valuation model)  ) ] > 
 
where the underlying information set, that in most equilibrium models is 
predicated on perfect and symmetric information, is a subset of the 
common knowledge set. 
 
Secondly, they should have made use of a transaction cost rate21, for 
instance the following one    
 
< 1 +  TC ( t, T, W WTC t  ) >  =   
 
< 1 + INT ( t, T, W WINT t  ) > . < 1  +  MICR( t, T,  W WMICR t   ) > . 
 
. < 1 + TAX (t, T, W WTAX t  ) > . < 1 +  INF (t, T, W WINF t ) > . < 1 + FIN (t, T, W WFIN t  ) > 
 
with the restriction   
 
W W k t     Í Í   W W TC t     for  k :  INT, MICR, INF, FIN, TAX22 
 
Finally, they would have worked out the expected return gross of 
enlarged transaction costs 
 
< 1  +  E[ r(A; W W  (c k)  ) ] >  =    
 
=  < 1  +  E[ r(A; W W  (valuation model)  ) ] >  .  < 1 +  TC ( t, T, W WTC t  ) >   
 
· Scenario 2:   Opportunistic behavior is added to superior  
technical information. 
 
Following the same line of reasoning, the seller’s information set now 
would turn out to be  
 
W W S    =  W W  (c k)  È È W WS  (p, tech)  È È  W WS  (p, opp) 
 
and when both parties cut the deal the expected returns for them would 
be depicted as 
 
1  +  E[ r(A; W W S ) ]   =   < 1  +  E[ r(A; W W B ) ] >  .  < 1  +  g( S )  >  
                                                 
21 This multiplicative model is suitable for a transaction cost structure and has been fully 
developed in Apreda (2000a, 2000b, 2004) 
22 Int stands for intermediation, micr for microstructure, inf for information, fin for financial, 
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but now the seller’s expected return would be greater than in the former 
scenario and the arbitrage gap richer than before, amounting to: 
 
< 1  +  g( S )  >   =   
 








We have argued that trade splits up the information sets of the economic 
actors who involve each other in such process, laying the foundations of 
this point of view, firstly, by means of partitions of the underlying sets in the 
first place, and secondly, by giving heed to imperfect information sets 
from which asymmetric information stems from.  
 
Next, we defined the dual nature of any trade, which led to regard the 
role the intermediary performs as one of broker of asymmetric information. 
At departure from generally held views, we have shown that 
intermediaries pursue their trade charging differential rates of return to 
their counterparts, rates that come defined over residual information sets. 
In this virtual exchange they are able to enhance the market efficiency, 
but also to follow opportunistic and rent-seeking behavior23.  We also 
proved that the final spread the dealer marks up eventually, can be 
broken down into spreads from the bide and ask side of the transaction, 
as well as the spread that comes from common knowledge. 
 
In the last part of the paper, we dealt with trading environments under 
opportunistic behavior. Here information sets were split up into three 
components: common, technical and opportunistic knowledge. The 
groundwork was done through two environments. In the first one, seller 
and buyer agree on the underlying value and close the deal in what we 
can term a fair exchange. In the second, the seller fixes a price that is 
higher than the fundamental value and the buyer signs out the deal in 
spite of the overvaluation. In the latter environment we distinguished two 
scenarios, one with no opportunistic behavior, the other including such 
behavior and superior technical information.  
 
                                                 
23 On this issue, a line of research leading to corporate governance has recently been 
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